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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Kristi L. Hurles appeals from the judgment and Order for Restitution and 
Judgment entered after she pied guilty to grand theft. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Hurles worked at the Crescent "No Lawyers" Bar and Grill ("Crescent"). 
(PSI, p.2. 1) Following an investigation into why the Crescent was losing money 
in its lottery account, it was discovered that the "payouts" while Hurles was 
working were above average. (PSI, pp.2-3.) A separate investigation into profit 
loss for ATM use also implicated Hurles. (PSI, p.3.) When contacted by a 
detective with the Boise Police Department, Hurles initially denied taking any 
money, but later admitted doing so "because her husband had lost his job."2 
(PSI, pp.3-4.) 
The state charged Hurles with two counts of grand theft. (R, pp.28-29.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Hurles pied guilty to one count and the state 
agreed to dismiss the other count and recommend a unified 14-year sentence 
with two years fixed. (2/17/2011 Tr., p.1, L.13 - p.2, L.17 (terms of plea 
agreement), pp.4-8 (entry of plea).) The terms of the agreement also provided 
that the state would request "restitution on all DRs that were disclosed in 
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file 
"HurlesPSl.pdf." 
2 Hurles' admission was limited to the ATM-related thefts; she "adamantly denied 
ever taking any money from the lottery." (PSI, p.4.) 
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discovery" and the dismissed charge. (2/17/2011 Tr., p.1, Ls.21-22, p.8, Ls.15-
17.) 
Because Hurles disputed the amount of restitution owed to Butch and 
Jody Morrison, the owners of the Crescent, the court conducted two restitution 
hearings. (2/17/2011 Tr., pp.15-19; see generally 5/19/2011 Tr. and 8/4/2011 
Tr.) Following these hearings, the court entered an order requiring Hurles to pay 
$204,734.61 in restitution. (R., pp.71-72.) The court also entered judgment, 
imposing a unified 14-year sentence with two years fixed. (R., pp.67-69.) Hurles 
filed a timely notice of appeal. (R, pp.73-75.) 
2 
ISSUES 
Hurles states the issue on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it concluded that the Morrisons did not 
implicitly waive the accountant-client privilege? 
2. Was the district court's restitution calculation supported by substantial 
competent evidence? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it included civil 
attorneys' fees as part of the restitution awarded in the criminal 
proceedings? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.9.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Hurles waived consideration of her claim of error in relation to 
the accountant-client privilege since she abandoned the claim in the district court 
and failed to get an adverse ruling on the issue? Alternatively, has Hurles failed 
to establish the Morrisons waived the privilege? 
2. Did the state present substantial competent evidence to support 
the restitution award? 
3. Is Hurles' claim that the court erred in awarding restitution for thefts 
occurring beyond the dates in the charging document without merit given that 
Hurles agreed, as part of her plea agreement, that the state could request 
restitution for those amounts? 
4. Has Hurles failed to establish the district court abused its discretion 
in awarding restitution to compensate the victims for the attorneys' fees they 




Hurles Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Not 
Allowing Her To Breach The Accountant-Client Privilege 
A. Introduction 
At the restitution hearing, Hurles sought to offer the testimony of James 
Warr, the Morrisons' accountant, to allegedly impeach some unspecified aspect 
of Jody's testimony. The Morrisons invoked the accountant-client privilege and 
the district court declined to allow Mr. Warr to testify absent some showing by 
Hurles that the privilege had been waived and what aspect of Jody's testimony 
was subject to impeachment by Mr. Warr. Hurles never made the specified 
showing. 
On appeal, Hurles contends the district court erred in concluding that the 
Morrisons did not "implicitly" waive the privilege when (1) "they relied on Mr. 
Warr's documents to establish the amount of restitution"; (2) Jody testified "as to 
the contents of her conversations with Mr. Warr"; and (3) "the prosecutor 
consented to allow defense counsel to discuss the amount of restitution with Mr. 
Warr." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Hurles' claim fails because she abandoned the 
issue below; therefore, this Court should decline to consider it. Alternatively, 
Hurles' claim fails on the merits because the proffered bases for waiver offered 
by Hurles are either erroneous or contradicted by the record. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The general rule in Idaho is that the trial court has sole discretion in 
deciding whether to admit or exclude evidence." State v. Howard, 135 Idaho 
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727, 24 P.3d 44, 48 (2001) (citation omitted). "Appellate courts review trial court 
decisions admitting or excluding evidence under the abuse of discretion 
standard." !st. at 731-732, 24 P.3d at 48-49. "The trial court's broad discretion in 
the admission of evidence at trial will be reversed only when there has been a 
clear abuse of that discretion." !st. at 732, 24 P.3d at 49. In evaluating a 
discretionary decision, this Court considers "1) whether the lower court rightly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion, 2) whether the court acted within the 
outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards 
applicable to specific choices, and 3) whether the court reached its decision by 
an exercise of reason." State v. Hoak, 147 Idaho 919, 921, 216 P.3d 1291, 1293 
(Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted). 
C. The Court Should Decline To Consider Hurles' Claim Regarding The 
Morrisons' Alleged Waiver Of The Accountant-Client Privilege Because 
She Abandoned The Claim Below 
On cross-examination at the initial restitution hearing, defense counsel 
asked Jody if her accountant was James Warr. (5/19/2011 Tr., p.62, Ls.24-25.) 
Jody testified that Mr. Warr was no longer their accountant, but was at one time. 
(5/19/2011 Tr., p.63, Ls.1-4.) Counsel then attempted to hand Jody some 
documents that he apparently obtained from Mr. Warr and asked Jody whether 
she or her husband ever "borrowed" money from the ATM. (5/19/2011 Tr., p.63, 
Ls.11-18, p.67, L.16-p.68, L.7; seealsop.77, Ls.20-23).) Jody denied that she 
or her husband ever did so and testified that, at one point, she actually funded 
the ATM "to the tune of $4,000" using her own money. (5/19/2011 Tr., p.67, L.18 
- p.68, L.12.) Counsel also asked Jody: "Didn't your accountant actually 
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confront you with the checks signed and endorsed by Butch, and you denied it 
for five months?" (5/19/2011 Tr., p.69, Ls.22-25.) Jody denied this was true. 
(5/19/2011 Tr., p.69, L.25.) Jody also explained that she had reports from her 
"then-accountant," Mr. Warr, showing an "imbalance in the credits and the debits 
of the ATM of checks written to the ATM." (5/19/2011 Tr., p.72, Ls.2-5.) 
Defense counsel also inquired into the existence of any "record of cash 
sales during this time period." (5/19/2011 Tr., p.19-20.) Jody answered: "I have 
records of them. I have -- we have daily cash recordings that we do every day. 
We have a monthly spreadsheet that is provided to my accountant." (5/19/2011 
Tr., p.77, L.23 - p.78, L.1.) Defense counsel then advised the court it was 
"going to hear from the accountant" that "we just don't have the records to 
establish" the claimed loss. (5/19/2011 Tr., p.79, Ls.20-25.) Defense counsel 
further indicated he had met with the accountant who was "prepared to testify." 
(5/19/2011 Tr., p.80, Ls.16-19.) Due to time constraints, the court continued the 
restitution hearing. (5/19/2011 Tr., p.80, Ls.1-12.) 
At the second hearing, Hurles called Mr. Warr as a witness. Following 
limited testimony by Mr. Warr regarding the nature of his relationship with the 
Morrisons and Crescent, the Morrisons asserted their accountant-client privilege. 
(8//4/2011 Tr., p.10, L.19-p.12, L.12.) Hurles responded that the privilege was 
waived because the Morrisons had filed a lawsuit against Mr. Warr, which 
allowed him to "now defend himself." (8/4/2011 Tr., p.12, Ls.16-18.) The court 
agreed there was a privilege and that the exception proffered by Hurles did not 
apply in the context of the restitution matter. (8/4/2011 Tr., p .13, L.21 - p .14, 
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L.24.) Defense counsel responded that, in the event Mr. Warr could not testify, 
he would like additional time to find another accountant "to review this 
information." (8/4/2011 Tr., p.14, L.25 - p.15, L.5, p.16, Ls.2-5.) Although the 
court granted the request for additional time to consult an accountant, defense 
counsel complained: "even hiring a CPA is not going to be able to get us the 
admissions made by the alleged victims in this case, which is really what we 
needed from Mr. Warr anyway." (8/4/2011 Tr., p.17, Ls.22-23, p.22, Ls.7-10.) 
Nevertheless, Hurles asked for and received an additional week. (8/4/2011 Tr., 
p.22, Ls.10-12., p.24, Ls.15-19.) 
At the final hearing, Hurles did not have a witness or additional evidence 
regarding restitution but instead revisited the issue of whether the accountant-
client privilege had been waived. (8/11/2011 Tr., p.95, L.13 - p.96, L.10.) 
Defense counsel argued that, although he had not had the opportunity to review 
the original restitution hearing, his recollection was that Jody testified "in either 
direct or on cross examination, about conversations she had with her 
accountant" and contended that by doing so she waived the privilege such that 
Hurles should be allowed to call Mr. Warr to impeach Jody. (8/11/2011 Tr., p.95, 
Ls.18-21, p.96, Ls.5-16.) Defense counsel also asserted he asked Jody 
"questions about transactions that took place after Ms. Hurles was released from 
the Crescent" and explained "[t]hat's a pretty significant portion of what [he] 
wanted the accountant" to testify about. (8/11/2011 Tr., p.96, L.22 - p.97, L.7.) 
The court responded: 
Okay. This is what we are going to do. I'm going to go 
ahead and sentence her today. I'm going to order the restitution 
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that's been proved to me at this point. I will give you 30 days in 
which to come in and move for reconsideration if you think that's 
inappropriate and try - and to prove to me that the . . . 
accountant/client relationship has been breached and that you are 
entitled, then, to bring the accountant in. 
You're going to have to do some research on that. And 
you're going to have to go back and listen to the original - the first 
restitution hearing in which the victim testified. And so we need to 
specifically know what it is that she said in relationship to her 
accountant to determine whether or not three was waiver. 
So it may require that you get a transcript of at least that part 
of the conversation. You wouldn't have to get one of the entire --
her entire testimony, but that part of it. So you may have to do that 
in your motion -- if you want to file a motion to reconsider. 
Looks to me like the only thing that - that stands between 
the restitution figure being requested and the client paying that 
amount is potentially whether or not the - you can impeach the 
victim through the accountant. 
(8/11/2011 Tr., p.97, L.23 - p.99, L.1.) 
Defense counsel agreed to the court's proposed course of action and 
agreed with the court's statement that the "only thing" standing "between the 
restitution figure being requested and [Hurles] paying that amount" was whether 
Jody could be impeached by the accountant. 3 (8/11/2011 Tr., p.98, L.8, p.99, 
Ls.2-4.) The court thereafter ordered restitution in the amount of $204,174.61, 
and Hurles never filed a motion to reconsider. (8/11/2011 Tr., p.103, Ls.11-12; 
3 When asked how he "gain[ed] knowledge that the accountant may have 
information that would be impeaching," defense counsel indicated he talked to 
Mr. Warr because he was originally subpoenaed by the state but defense 
counsel declined to provide any additional information regarding the nature of his 
discussion with Mr. Warr. (8/11/2011 Tr., p.99, Ls.5-25; see also 8/4/2011 Tr., 
p.15, Ls.22-24 (defense counsel stated at the prior hearing: "I don't want to do 
anything to hurt Mr. Warr or myself. I don't want to disclose anything.") 
8 
R., pp.71-72; see R., pp.3-4 (ROA reflecting no motion to reconsider never 
filed).) 
Despite the opportunity to establish that Jody Morrison waived the 
accountant-client privilege, Hurles never followed-up on the court's invitation to 
do so. Because Hurles never afforded the district court the opportunity to make 
an informed ruling on whether the privilege had been waived, she should be 
foreclosed from raising the issue on appeal. See State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 
378, 384, 987 P.2d 290, 296 (1999) (quoting State v. Fisher, 123 Idaho 481, 
485, 849 P.2d 942, 946 (1993)) (appellate court "will not 'review a trial court's 
alleged error on appeal unless the record discloses an adverse ruling which 
forms the basis for an assignment of error"'). Moreover, Hurles' request for 
review of this claim ignores the possibility that, upon further discussion with Mr. 
Warr and review of Jody's testimony, defense counsel made a decision that the 
privilege was not waived or that Mr. Warr could not, or would not, testify as to 
any statements Jody allegedly made to him during his representation of her. 
Based on the record before it, this Court should decline to consider Hurles' claim 
of error in relation to the Morrisons' invocation of the accountant-client privilege. 
D. Even If The Court Considers The Merits Of Hurles' Privilege Claim, Hurles 
Has Failed To Show She Was Entitled To Call The Morrisons' Accountant 
As A Witness To Inquire About The Unwaived Privileged Communications 
Between Them 
Rule 515(b), I.RE., sets forth the accountant-client privilege as follows: 
A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any 
other person from disclosing confidential communications made for 
the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional accounting 
services to the client which were made (1) between the client or the 
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client's representative and the accountant or the accountant's 
representative, (2) between the accountant and the accountant's 
representative, or (3) by the client or the client's representative or 
the client's accountant or a representative of the accountant to an 
accountant or a representative of an accountant representing 
another concerning a matter of common interest, (4) between 
representatives of the client or between the client and a 
representative of the client, or (5) among accountants and their 
representatives representing the same client. 
The privilege is also codified in I.C. § 9-203A, which reads: "Any licensed 
public accountant, or certified public accountant, cannot, without the consent of 
his client, be examined as a witness as to any communication made by the client 
to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment." 
Hurles does not appear to dispute, nor did she assert below, that any 
testimony Mr. Warr may have offered was privileged for purposes of I.R.E. 
515(b) or I.C. § 9-203A. (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Rather, Hurles contends the 
privilege was waived when: (1) "they relied on Mr. Warr's documents to establish 
the amount of restitution"; (2) Jody testified "as to the contents of her 
conversations with Mr. Warr"; and (3) "the prosecutor consented to allow defense 
counsel to discuss the amount of restitution with Mr. Warr." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.10.) All of Hurles' arguments regarding waiver lack merit. 
First, the state did not "rel[y] on Mr. Warr's documents to calculate the 
amount of restitution." (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) At no time during the state's 
presentation of evidence in the restitution hearing did the prosecutor offer Mr. 
Warr's documents to "calculate the restitution amount." The documentary 
evidence admitted in support of the restitution request was the spreadsheet 
prepared by Ms. Berriochoa from Givens Pursley, not Mr. Warr. While the Loss 
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Statement - Request for Restitution Jody prepared and submitted to the 
presentence investigator has documents attached that appear to have been 
faxed by Mr. Warr's accounting firm, Wilson, Harrison & Co., Hurles' assertion 
that these documents were ultimately relied upon to support the restitution 
request is unsupported by the record. (PSI, pp.289-96 (Loss Statement -
Request for Restitution); 8/4/2011 Tr., p.10, L.19 - p.11, L.16 (Mr. Warr's 
testimony that he is a partner with Wilson Harrison Company and previously 
represented Crescent); see generally 5/19/2011 Tr. (evidence offered in support 
of restitution hearing); State's Exhibit 1 (spreadsheet with restitution amounts).) 
In fact, the cover letter from the Morrisons' attorney to the prosecutor that 
accompanied Ms. Berriochoa's spreadsheet states the "spreadsheet is based on 
the check and deposit records and U.S. Bank statements kept and provided by 
Butch and Jody Morrison." (PSI, p.187.) 
The basis for Hurles' argument to the contrary is defense counsel's 
comments from the second restitution hearing where he stated: "here is my 
problem. They're going to use Mr. Warr's documents for the presentence 
investigation, they can't claim privilege and turn around and say, okay, he can't 
testify as to what those documents are." (Appellant's Brief, p.15 (quoting 
8/4/2011 Tr., p.17, Ls.12-16).) Hurles has taken this comment out of context. 
That comment was made in response to a statement by the prosecutor wherein 
she noted that, based on the information in the police reports, Mr. Warr's "view 
[was] that there was a theft, and the fact that it was over $100,000 is already 
documented in the police reports." (8/4/2011 Tr., p.17, Ls.5-7.) It is in response 
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to that statement that defense counsel commented about the state's alleged 
"use" of Mr. Warr's documents. However, as noted by the district court, the 
state's point was not that it was relying on Mr. Warr's documents to prove the 
amount owed but to show that "even if Mr. Warr testifies, he's still saying that 
there's only $100,000." (8/4/2011 Tr., p.17, Ls.14-19.) Indeed, it would be 
curious for the state to attempt to "rely" on Mr. Warr's documents at the August 4 
hearing when it had already proven the restitution at the May 19 hearing using 
the spreadsheet prepared by Ms. Berriochoa, which was "based on the check 
and deposit records and U.S. bank statements kept and provided by Butch and 
Jody Morrison." (PSI, p.187.) 
Hurles also notes that Jody testified at the restitution hearing that she had 
"records from [her] then accountant, James Warr, who showed an imbalance in 
the credits and the debits of the ATM of checks written to the ATM." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.16 (quoting 5/19/2011 Tr., p.72, Ls.2-5).) Jody then referenced that the 
differences were reflected in "column 4." (Appellant's Brief, p.16 (quoting 
5/19/2011 Tr., p.72, Ls.7-8).) That Morrison may have obtained accounting 
records from Mr. Warr does not, however, mean the state relied on his "work 
product" to calculate the restitution award. While Mr. Warr's accounting records 
may have uncovered the imbalance, the actual work product used in calculating 
the loss was prepared by Ms. Berriochoa, not Mr. Warr, and Jody's reference to 
"column 4" is clearly a reference to column 4 in State's Exhibit 1, not to any 
document created by Mr. Warr. 
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Further, Hurles seems to misunderstand the distinction between whether 
Mr. Warr could discuss the preparation of a certain document if the state had 
relied on it and the ability to go beyond that and disclose confidential 
communications between him and the Morrisons. Laying foundation for or 
explaining the meaning of a document does not mean the Morrisons would 
implicitly waive any privilege between them and their accountant. Nevertheless, 
because Hurles' contention that the state relied on Mr. Warr's documents to 
"calculate the amount of restitution" is belied by the record, her claim that the 
Morrisons' implicitly waived the accountant-client privilege as a result fails. 
Hurles next asserts Jody "waived the privilege because she disclosed 
communications between herself and Mr. Warr." (Appellant's Brief, p.17.) 
Hurles, however, is unclear about what communications she contends Jody 
disclosed. Her first argument is based on defense counsel's statements at the 
second restitution hearing where he commented that, based on his "recollection," 
Jody testified "about conversations she had with her accountant." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.17.) But Hurles does not identify the testimony she believes waived the 
privilege beyond the fact that, on cross-examination, she testified that "Mr. Warr 
told her about a $1,300.00 accounting discrepancy, and that he had created new 
booking procedures for [Crescent] after discovering various accounting problems 
and [the] theft." (Appellant's Brief, p.17 (citing 5/19/2011 Tr., p.62, L.24 - p.70, 
L.11 ).) This testimony was in response to cross-examination generally designed 
to imply that money missing from the ATM was, at least in part, attributable to 
Jody and Butch "borrowing" money from it. (5/19/2011 Tr., p.62, L.24 - p.70, 
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L.11.) However, "[a]s a general rule, a party does not waive the privilege by 
denying the opposing party's accusations .... In addition, a Court cannot justify 
finding a waiver of privileged information merely to provide the opposing party 
information helpful to its cross-examination or because information is relevant." 
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Gussin, 714 A.2d 188 (Md. 1998) (citations and 
quotations omitted). Further, it is difficult to imagine how responding to 
questions on cross-examination about the fact Mr. Warr alerted Jody to an 
accounting discrepancy regarding the A TM resulted in a waiver of the privileged 
communications between her and Mr. Warr. 
Hurles' third argument in support of her implied waiver claim is that the 
"Morrisons waived the accountant-client privilege when they had defense 
counsel speak with Mr. Warr about the amount of restitution." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.17 (emphasis added).) This argument is unsupported by any evidence in the 
record. It instead appears to be an extrapolation based on the fact that the state 
subpoenaed Mr. Warr for the original restitution hearing, although it never called 
him as a witness. (Appellant's Brief, p.17.) That Mr. Warr may have agreed to 
meet with defense counsel because he was subpoenaed does not mean the 
Morrisons "had defense counsel contact him to discuss restitution calculations." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.19.) Since there is no basis for finding that defense counsel 
interviewed Mr. Warr at the Morrisons' request, much less with their consent, 
Hurles' claim of an implied waiver on this basis fails. 
Finally, Hurles asserts, in conjunction with her waiver argument, that Mr. 
Warr's testimony "was necessary because it is the only means by which the 
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district court and Ms. Hurles could get an accurate restitution estimate" since it 
was Mr. Warr who "c[a]me up with an amount of loss from the ATM." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.19.) Hurles further asserts: "Since [she] was cashing 
checks, then returning a portion of the proceeds into the ATM, there is no way of 
calculating the restitution without the [sic] Mr. Warr's testimony." (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.19-20.) This argument is nonsensical. While Mr. Warr at one point 
provided information to the Morrisons regarding the discrepancies in the ATM, it 
does not logically follow that he is the only person would could calculate the 
Morrisons' loss. Not even defense counsel suggested as much. To the contrary, 
defense counsel's position was not that Mr. Warr was the only person qualified 
to calculate restitution, it was that Mr. Warr's testimony was needed to obtain 
"the admissions made by the alleged victims in this case." (8/4/2011 Tr., p.22, 
Ls.8-9.) Hurles' claim that "there is no way of calculating the restitution without 
the [sic] Mr. Warr's testimony" is incorrect. 
In a related argument, Hurles argues Mr. Warr's testimony was necessary 
to "impeach" Jody "over her assertion that the Morrisons were not taking money 
out of the ATM." (Appellant's Brief, p.20.) In support of this argument, Hurles 
recites defense counsel's question on cross-examination of Jody, "Didn't your 
accountant actually confront you with the checks signed and endorsed by Butch, 
and you denied it for five months?" (Appellant's Brief, p.20 (quoting 5/19/2011 
Tr., p.69, Ls.22-24 (alteration by Hurles omitted).) Hurles then asserts, "If 
defense counsel's position is true, then [Jody] lied to the court by inflating the 
amount of money Ms. Hurles stole from them." (Appellant's Brief, p.20.) The 
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fundamental problem with Hurles' argument is that there is no evidence that 
defense counsel's "position is true." The fact that he implied something through 
cross-examination does not make it so. Nor did defense counsel ever offer 
evidence that Mr. Warr could impeach Jody on this point even though the court 
invited him to do so. Hurles is not entitled to relief based upon suppositions she 
failed to support with evidence in the district court. 
Because Hurles abandoned her waiver claim, the Court should decline to 
consider it. Even if considered, Hurles has failed to demonstrate any error in 
relation to the exclusion of Mr. Warr's testimony. 
11. 
The State Presented Substantial Evidence To Support The Restitution Award 
A. Introduction 
The district court ordered Hurles to pay restitution to compensate the 
Morrisons for the money she stole from them and the costs associated with 
recovering those losses. (R., pp.71-72.) On appeal, Hurles posits a variety of 
reasons she believes the restitution award is not supported by substantial 
competent evidence. (Appellant's Brief, pp.21-29.) A review of the evidence 
presented at the restitution hearing shows otherwise. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision whether to order restitution and in what amount is committed 
to the trial court's discretion. State v. Higley, 151 Idaho 76, 78, 253 P.3d 750, 
752 (Ct. App. 2010); State v. Card, 146 Idaho 111, 114, 190 P.3d 930,933 (Ct. 
App. 2008); In Re Doe, 146 Idaho 277, 284, 192 P.3d 1101, 1108 (Ct. App. 
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2008); State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 687, 692, 169 P.3d 275, 280 (Ct. App. 2007). 
The trial court's factual findings in relation to restitution will not be disturbed if 
supported by substantial evidence. Smith, 144 Idaho at 692, 169 P.3d at 280. 
C. Substantial Evidence Supports The District Court's Restitution Order 
Idaho Code § 19-5304(2) authorizes a court to "order a defendant found 
guilty of any crime which results in an economic loss to the victim to make 
restitution to the victim." "Determination of economic loss is based upon the civil 
preponderance of the evidence standard." State v. Hill, --- Idaho ---, 296 P.3d 
412, 418 (Ct. App. 2012) (citations omitted). In calculating a restitution award, 
the court "may consider such hearsay as may be contained in presentence 
report, victim impact statement or otherwise provided to the court." I.C. § 19-
5304(6). 
At the restitution hearing, Kimberly Morrison, an investigative assistant 
with the Idaho Lottery, testified that the average payout on a set of pull-tab 
lottery tickets would be between 68 and 72 percent. (5/19/2011 Tr., p.8, Ls.3-9, 
p.10, Ls.9-20.) In fact, a payout above 72 percent would be "impossible." 
(5/19/2011 Tr., p.11, Ls.18-23.) A review of the amounts paid when Hurles4 was 
responsible for making the payouts showed they were "high," demonstrating she 
was "inflating the amount of the payouts and pocketing them." (5/19/2011 Tr., 
p.13, Ls.2-10.) The amount attributable to the excess pay-outs was $10,000.00. 
(5/19/2011 Tr., p.14, Ls.13-16.) 
4 Hurles was also sometimes referred to as "Cookie," a nickname given to her by 
Jody Morrison. (5/19/2011 Tr., p.15, Ls.20-23, p.53, Ls.9-24.) 
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Alison Berriochoa, a paralegal with Givens Pursley, the law firm retained 
by the Morrisons, reviewed a number of checks provided by the Morrisons that 
were negotiated for cash rather than deposited. (5/19/2011 Tr., p.24, L.18 -
p.27, L.11.) Several checks had "ATM" in the notation line, indicating they were 
"written as markers" for cash that "had been removed from petty cash for [use in] 
the ATM." (5/19/2011 Tr., p.29, Ls.6-21, p.30, L.4 - p.31, L.3; State's Exhibit 1, 
columns 4, 13.) Although the A TM "marker" checks were to be deposited, 
several were cashed without the Morrisons' permission. (5/19/2011 Tr., p.55, 
Ls.2-18.) Between 2005 and 2010, Hurles had primary responsibility for 
"stocking the ATM" and was the Crescent's primary bookkeeper. (5/19/2011 Tr., 
p.53, L.25 - p.55, L.1, p.55, L.19 - p.56. L.10.) During that same timeframe, 
Hurles had access to the petty cash in the safe and her responsibilities included 
making deposits. (5/19/2011 Tr., p.42, Ls.15-22, p.43, L.9 - p.44, L.3.) 
To fund the ATM, Hurles would write an "IOU" to place in petty cash, 
which would later be replaced "with a check denoted to ATM." (5/19/2011 Tr., 
p.47, L.19 - p.48, L.5.) The ATM "marker checks" were then to be included with 
the daily bank deposit and replaced in petty cash with cash from the daily 
receipts. (5/19/2011 Tr., p.49, L.3 - p.50, L.3.) "All checks were to be 
deposited." (5/19/2011 Tr., p.50, L.17.) The exception was when Jody or Butch 
"scratch[ed] out 'for deposit only" and put [their] name on it." (5/19/2011 Tr., 
p.50, L.18 - p.51, L. 7.) Jody would "[n]ever" authorize an employee to cash the 
checks. (5/19/2011 Tr., p.51, Ls.21-25.) 
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Ms. Berriochoa also reviewed a number of checks that were endorsed by 
Hurles. (5/19/2011 Tr., p.31, L.5 - p.32, L.32, L.8; State's Exhibit 1.) The total 
loss for the ATM "marker" checks and the endorsed checks was $145,440.00. 5 
(5/19/2011 Tr., p.32, Ls.9-17, p.34, L.19 - p.35, L.15, p.56, L.23 - p.57, L.4; 
State's Exhibit 1; 8/4/2011 Tr., p.16, Ls.14-24, p.21, Ls.4-10.) 
At the district court's urging, the state also submitted the legal fees the 
Morrisons incurred for "separate issues" that Hurles' theft "created." (5/19/2011 
Tr., p.84, Ls.5-16; 8/4/2011 Tr., p.16, Ls.14-24.) Those fees totaled $48,734.61. 
(8/4/2011 Tr., p.16, Ls.18-20; R., p.72; PSI, p.52.) 
Based on the evidence presented, the court awarded restitution in the 
amount of $204,174.00. (8/11/2011 Tr., p.103, Ls.11-12; R., pp.71-72.) Hurles 
asserts the restitution awarded in this case was not supported by substantial 
evidence because, she argues, (1) the "restitution amount requested by the 
Morrisons was not credible, as there were significant ranges of restitution 
estimates"; (2) "the restitution figure should have been offset by an insurance 
payment the Morrisons received" in the amount of $2,500.00; (3) the restitution 
calculation did not "take into consideration" that she "was only taking ten to 
twenty percent of the checks she cashed;" and (4) the restitution included losses 
sustained between 2005 and November 2008, which was outside the period 
5 There were also a number of checks totaling $100,110.00 that were not 
stamped, endorsed, or deposited. (State's Exhibit 1, Column 7.) Because that 
loss could not be specifically attributed to Hurles, the Morrisons did not seek 
restitution from Hurles for that portion of their loss. (5/19/2011 Tr., p.77, L.12 -
p.58, L.11.) 
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alleged in the lnformation.6 (Appellant's Brief, pp.25-29.) None of Hurles' 
arguments demonstrates the absence of substantial evidence to support the 
district court's restitution award. Each argument will be addressed in turn. 
First, Hurles' claim that the amount requested was not credible because 
there "were significant ranges of restitution estimates" is without merit. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.25.) This argument is based on variations between the 
amount included in the "Loss Statement - Request for Restitution" provided to 
the presentence investigator (PSI, pp.6, 289-96), the total loss calculated by 
Givens Pursley (State's Exhibit 1 ), the calculations performed by the 
investigating officer from the Boise Police Department (PSI, p.214), and the 
dollar amount solely attributable to the checks Hurles endorsed. (Appellant's 
Brief, p.25.) Whatever variations existed is irrelevant to the question of whether 
there was substantial evidence presented to support the restitution amount 
awarded. Moreover, Hurles' argument ignores that the restitution amount 
ultimately awarded consisted of three components: (1) the loss associated with 
the lottery tickets; (2) the losses associated with checks that were cashed; and 
(3) attorneys' fees. The variations she highlights are primarily due to calculations 
6 Hurles' challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence of the restitution award 
does not appear to encompass the sufficiency of the evidence related to the 
portion of the award attributable to attorneys' fees. Hurles, however, does 
contend the district court erred in including those fees as part of the restitution 
award, which contention will be addressed in Section IV, infra. Hurles' challenge 
to the sufficiency of the evidence also does not appear to relate to the 
$10,000.00 attributable to the lottery-related thefts. The state's response to her 
sufficiency argument will, therefore, assume she is only challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence for the amounts awarded based on the checks 
identified in State's Exhibit 1. 
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of different items. For example, the loss calculated by Givens Pursley was for all 
checks that were never deposited, but the Morrisons did not seek restitution from 
Hurles for the entire amount. (See 5/19/2011 Tr., p.36, Ls.15-16, p.77, L.12 -
p.58, L.11; State's Exhibit 1.) As another example, the checks Hurles endorsed 
that totaled $39,000 was only one component of the restitution award - it is not a 
total restitution estimate as she suggests. (Appellant's Brief, p.25.) Hurles' claim 
that the restitution award was not supported by substantial evidence because, at 
various times, there were different calculations based on different information 
fails. 
Hurles' second argument is that the restitution award should have been 
"offset by an insurance payment the Morrisons received." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.25.) Hurles is incorrect. Hurles correctly notes the record reflects that Acuity, 
an insurance company, paid $2,500.00 to Crescent for theft. (Appellant's Brief, 
p.25.) According to the letter from Acuity upon which Hurles relies, the payment 
was for a date of loss of "May 25, 2010." (PSI, p.310.) What Hurles has failed to 
demonstrate is that any of the restitution award entered by the district court 
incorporated the loss for which the Morrisons were compensated by Acuity. In 
fact, the last date entered on the spreadsheet admitted as State's Exhibit 1, 
which lists the losses associated with various checks, is March 12, 2010, more 
than two months prior to the date of loss reflected in the Acuity letter. The 
court's restitution calculation was based on the evidence presented. Although 
the record shows that Acuity also requested restitution, as they were entitled to 
do, I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e)(iv), there was no evidence presented, nor argument by 
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Hurles below, that the Morrisons were awarded restitution for an amount due and 
owing to Acuity. 7 Hurles' claim to the contrary is unsupported by the record. 
Next, Hurles argues the "main problem" with the evidence is that she "was 
only taking ten to twenty percent of the checks she cashed, but Ms. Berriochoa 
said she did not take that into consideration." (Appellant's Brief, p.26.) That the 
court did not believe Hurles does not make the evidence offered in support of the 
restitution award insufficient. As noted by the court when Hurles denied she 
stole the amount of money attributed to her, Hurles is "the thief in all of this." 
(8/11/2011 Tr., p.131, L.20.) Just because Hurles denied stealing the amount 
awarded does not mean the court had to accept her version or that the evidence 
was insufficient. It is also worth noting that Hurles' claim that, when she cashed 
the A TM checks, she only kept "ten to twenty percent" and put the rest in the 
A TM machine is contrary to how the Crescent stocked the ATM. As explained 
by Jody, and later reiterated by the prosecutor, the ATM was stocked from petty 
cash using an "IOU." (8/11/2011 Tr., p.127, L.9 - p.128, L.3.) The IOU was then 
replaced with a check denoting it was for the ATM and all checks were to be 
deposited, not cashed. The ATM check was then "sold" to the deposit and 
replaced with cash from the daily receipts. (5/19/2011 Tr., p.74, L.23 - p.75, 
7 Defense counsel was certainly aware that any restitution award should be 
offset by payments the Morrisons might receive from other sources for the same 
loss. (8/11/2011 Tr., p.118, L.18 - p.119, L.16 (commenting on the civil suits 
filed by the Morrisons against their bank and accountant and suggesting that the 
court be made aware of any judgment or settlement in those cases so that the 
restitution could be "adjusted accordingly").) However, Hurles cites to nothing in 
the record indicating an objection to the restitution award based on an assertion 
that it included the payment by Acuity. (Appellant's Brief, p.25.) 
22 
L.4.) Hurles' claim that the restitution award was unsupported by evidence 
because she has a different, non-credible, version of her theft is without merit. 
Finally, Hurles contends the restitution award is unsupported by the 
evidence because "many of the checks were endorsed by the Morrisons, W.B., 
and D.B. but were included in the restitution total." (Appellant's Brief, p.26.) To 
the contrary, the restitution award does not appear to include amounts for 
checks endorsed by other individuals. Rather, the restitution was based on the 
amounts listed in columns 4, 5, 8, and part of 11 of State's Exhibit 1. (5/19/2011 
Tr., p.32, Ls.9-16 (adding up "columns 4, 5, 8, and only the $4,300 of column 11 
that were endorsed by Ms. Hurles"), p.56, L.23 - p.57, L.11 (referring to total 
based on the amounts in column 4 and "roughly $39,000 in checks that have Ms. 
Hurles's name on the back").) This argument fails along with all of Hurles' other 
arguments. 
There was substantial evidence to support the district court's restitution 
award. Hurles has failed to show otherwise. 
111. 
Because Hurles Agreed The State Could Seek Restitution For Uncharged 
Thefts, Her Claim That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Including 
Uncharged Amounts In The Award Is Without Merit 
The state originally charged Hurles with two counts of grand theft. The 
first count alleged that, between December 30, 2008, and December 31, 2009, 
Hurles wrongfully took in excess of $1,000.00 "from the pull tab profits from the 
owner." (R., p.29.) The second count alleged that, between the same dates, 
Hurles wrongfully took in excess of $1,000.00 "from the ATM profits" of Crescent. 
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(R., p.29.) Pursuant to an agreement, Hurles pied guilty to Count II and the state 
agreed to dismiss Count I. (2/17/2011 Tr., p.3, Ls.5-14.) The plea agreement 
also allowed the state to seek restitution "on all DRs that were disclosed in 
discovery." (2/17/2011 Tr., p.1, Ls.21-21.) Prior to sentencing, which occurred 
after the restitution hearing, the court reiterated the terms of the agreement as to 
restitution, stating: "You are to pay restitution on all incidences, not simply the 
one grand theft charge, but the entire time that you were there working for the 
employer and any thefts that may have occurred. So restitution was to cover all 
of that." (8/11/2011 Tr., p.103, Ls.18-23.) Hurles agreed that was her 
understanding. (8/11/2011 Tr., p.104, Ls.1-3.) Hurles' acknowledgement was 
also consistent with the restitution proceedings and the lack of any objection to 
the amounts requested or reflected in State's Exhibit 1 as being beyond the 
scope of the charging document or the terms of the plea agreement.8 (See 
generally 5/19/2011 Tr.) 
Despite her agreement otherwise, Hurles asserts on appeal "that I.C. §19-
5304 only allows the district court to award restitution for the alleged thefts that 
occurred from December of 2008 to December of 2009, and any restitution 
8 In fact, at one point during the restitution hearing when defense counsel asked 
Jody Morrison about losses incurred between 2005 to 2010, she responded, 
"2004 to 2010." (5/19/2011 Tr., p.73, Ls.11-13.) Defense counsel corrected 
Jody, stating: "Okay. We are not really dealing with 2004 because that's - I 
would just submit to the court, I think that the prosecutor and I both agree that's 
outside the statute of limitations. So we're not -- 2004 is not in the equation." 
(5/19/2011 Tr., p.73, Ls.14-19.) The prosecutor confirmed that the 
"spreadsheet" (State's Exhibit 1) and related restitution request only covers 
losses between 2005 to 2010 and does not extend back through 2004. 
(5/19/2011 Tr., p.73. :/20 - p.74, L.3.) 
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which was based on thefts which occurred outside of that period should not have 
been included in the restitution order." (Appellant's Brief, p.27.) To the contrary, 
I.C. § 19-5304(9) provides: "The court may, with the consent of the parties, 
order restitution to victims ... for economic loss or injury for crimes which are not 
adjudicated or are not before the court." Although Hurles recognizes this 
principle she fails to acknowledge its application to her case.9 (Appellant's Brief, 
p.28.) Because the record and the law contradict Hurles' claim that restitution 
could only be awarded for the thefts "which occurred from December 2008 to 
December 2009," she has failed to establish the district court abused its 
discretion by awarding restitution for the timeframe contemplated by the plea 
agreement. 
IV. 
Hurles Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Awarding Restitution For The Morrisons' Attorneys' Fees 
A. Introduction 
Hurles contends the district court abused its discretion when it concluded 
civil attorneys' fees in its restitution award because, she asserts, "civil attorney 
fees have been characterized by the Idaho Court of Appeals as non-economic 
damages which are not awardable pursuant to Idaho's criminal restitution 
9 It is also curious that Hurles argues restitution is limited to the thefts occurring 
between 2008 and 2009 but makes no distinction between the different nature of 
the thefts alleged in Counts I and 11 - the first relating to the lottery thefts and the 
second to the A TM thefts. If the restitution was actually limited to the offense 
Hurles pied guilty to (Count II), then the Morrisons would not be entitled to the 
$10,000.00 attributed to the lottery thefts, which was also awarded without 
objection by Hurles. 
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statute." (Appellant's Brief, pp.29-30.) Application of the correct legal standards 
shows Hurles has failed to show error in the restitution award for the Morrisons' 
attorneys' fees. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision whether to order restitution and in what amount is committed 
to the trial court's discretion. Higley. 151 Idaho at 78, 253 P.3d at 752. A 
decision to award restitution will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Cottrell, 152 Idaho 387, 391, 271 P.3d 1243, 1247 (Ct. App. 2012). "An 
abuse of discretion may be shown if the order of restitution was the result of 
arbitrary action rather than logical application of the proper factors in Idaho Code 
§ 19-5304(7)." & 
C. Hurles Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
By Including The Morrisons' Attorneys' Fees In The Restitution Award 
For purposes of Idaho's restitution statute, a "victim" includes any "person 
or entity, who suffers economic loss or injury as the result of the defendant's 
criminal conduct." I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(e)(i) (emphasis added). "Economic loss" 
includes, among other things, "the value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or 
otherwise harmed ... resulting from the criminal conduct." I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a) 
(emphasis added). 
Huries correctly notes that, in State v. Parker, 143 Idaho 165, 139 P.3d 
767 (Ct. App. 2006), the Court of Appeals considered whether civil attorneys' 
fees are a compensable loss under I.C. § 19-5304. (Appellant's Brief, p.30.) In 
Parker, the defendant was convicted of forgery and her victim filed a civil action 
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against her and others. 143 Idaho at 166, 139 P.3d at 768. The district court in 
Parker's criminal case ordered her to pay restitution for "the amounts of the 
forged checks" and "for attorney fees the victim had incurred in the civil case." 
lit at 166-67, 139 P.3d at 768-69. On appeal, Parker asserted the attorney fees 
were "not a direct economic loss resulting from her criminal conduct" and were 
therefore "not appropriate as restitution." lit at 167, 139 P.3d at 769. The Court 
of Appeals agreed. In doing so, the Court reasoned: 
[Our] cases show that "economic loss" includes necessary 
expenses or losses that the victim incurred in order to address the 
consequences of the criminal conduct. 
It does not follow, however, that restitution may be ordered 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304 for any out-of-pocket expenses that the 
victim would not have incurred but for the defendant's crime .... 
[T]he principal question in assessing the restitution award for 
attorney fees in the present case is whether the attorney fees for 
filing the civil lawsuit were an expense that was necessary in order 
for the victim to recover the losses caused by Parker's forgeries. It 
is apparent they were not. The only claim alleged in the civil 
complaint relating to the forged checks was for the amount of the 
forged checks, which is precisely what the victim was clearly 
entitled to receive and did receive in the restitution order. The 
victim's civil complaint also claimed damages for overpayment of 
wages that resulted from Parker submitting false time sheets, and 
for conspiracy and unjust enrichment related to two other 
defendants. None of these additional damages are alleged to have 
resulted from the forgeries. Under these circumstances, the 
lawsuit and the associated attorney fees were unnecessary to 
recover the victim's direct loss caused by the forgeries, for that loss 
was entirely compensable through the restitution order in the 
criminal case. Any judgment that the victim might have recovered 
in the civil litigation for the forged checks would have been 
duplicative of the restitution ordered in the criminal case. 
Therefore, the attorney fees related to the lawsuit are not economic 
loss compensable through a restitution order under I.C. § 19-
5304(1)(a). 
Parker, 143 Idaho at 167-68, 139 P.3d at 769-70. 
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However, since Parker was decided, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its 
opinion in State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d 398, 401 (2011), 
wherein the Court explained the causation analysis applicable to restitution 
cases. In Corbus, the Court explained, "for restitution to be appropriate, there 
must be a causal connection between the conduct for which the defendant is 
convicted and the injuries suffered by the victim." State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 
599, 602, 249 P.3d 398, 401 (2011). "[C]ausation consists of actual cause and 
true proximate cause." kl (citing State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 374, 223 
P.3d 750, 757 (2009)). The Court articulated the distinction between actual and 
proximate cause as follows: 
"Actual cause is the factual question of whether a particular event 
produced a particular consequence. [Lampien, 148 Idaho at 37 4, 
223 P.3d at 757] (quoting [Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 875, 
204 P.3d 508, 515 (2009)]). The "but for" test is used in 
circumstances where there is only one actual cause or where two 
or more possible causes were not acting concurrently. Id. On the 
other hand, true proximate cause deals with "whether it was 
reasonably foreseeable that such harm would flow from the 
negligent conduct." Id. (quoting Cramer, 146 Idaho at 875, 204 
P.3d at 515). In analyzing proximate cause, this Court must 
determine whether the injury and manner of occurrence are so 
highly unusual "that a reasonable person, making an inventory of 
the possibilities of harm which his conduct might produce, would 
not have reasonably expected the injury to occur." Id. (quoting 
Cramer, 146 Idaho at 875,204 P.3d at 515). 
Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 P.3d at 401. See also State v. Cottrell, 152 Idaho 
387, 392, 271 P.3d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 2012). The determinations of actual 
cause and proximate cause are both factual questions. Corbus, 150 Idaho at 
602, 249 P.3d at 401; Cottrell, 152 Idaho at 392, 271 P.3d at 1248. 
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The attorneys' fees awarded as part of the court's restitution award in this 
case were described as follows: 
Firm Date Total Description 
Strother Law Office June-11 $ 4,429.45 Legal fees associated 
with possible complaint 
against Wilson Harris 
& Co and James Warr 
McAnaney & Assoc. May-11 $ 8,931.95 Accountant review in 
preparation of filing 
complaint against 
Wilson Harris & Co 
and James Warr 
Givens Pursley LLP Aug-10 $ 14,602.44 Legal fees associated 
through with complaint against 
Jun-11 us Bank Association 
(11098-1) 
Givens Pursley LLP Jan-11 $ 4,017.04 Legal fees associated 
through with filing adversarial 
May-11 complaint in Hurles 
bankruptcy (11098-3) 
Givens Pursley LLP Jan-11 $ 14,876.73 Legal fees associated 
through with Hurles restitution 
June-11 and sentencing hearing 
(11098-4) 
Givens Pursley LLP May-11 $ 1,877.00 Legal fees associated 
through with filing complaing 
June-11 [sic] against Wilson 
Harris & Co and James 
Warr (11098-5) 
TOTAL $ 48,734.61 
(PSI, p.52.) 
Hurles contends the award for fees related to the lawsuit against Mr. Warr 
are not compensable under Parker because "it is a [sic] not based on Ms. Hurles' 
thefts, but Mr. Warr's alleged breach of his duty to the Morrisons." (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.32-33.) With respect to the attorneys' fees the Morrisons incurred in 
suing the bank that facilitated Hurles' thefts by cashing checks Hurles unlawfully 
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endorsed, some of which were marked "Deposit Only" (see State's Exhibit 1 ), 
Hurles contends the fees are not compensable under Parker because "as with 
the lawsuit against Mr. Warr, it is against a third party." (Appellant's Brief, p.33.) 
Hurles further argues that because "neither of these lawsuits were final at the 
time of the restitution/sentencing hearings," this is "another reason why 
restitution could not be ordered for the civil lawsuits under Parker." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.33.) However, as noted, the question is whether the Morrisons' 
attorneys' fees were the actual and proximate cause of Hurles' thefts. Although 
the record does not include much detail regarding the lawsuits filed by the 
Morrisons against their accountant and bank, the lawsuits were undoubtedly filed 
as the result of Hurles' thefts as demonstrated by the state's submission of those 
amounts in response to the court's request. Thus, the "but-for" or actual cause 
test is satisfied. 
The proximate cause requirement is also satisfied because the lawsuits 
are not so "highly unusual that a reasonable person, making an inventory of the 
possibilities of harm which his conduct might produce, would not have 
reasonably expected the [lawsuits] to occur." Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 
P.3d at 401 (citation and quotations omitted). Hurles could surely foresee that 
the Morrisons would seek recourse from the bank who was improperly cashing 
checks for Hurles and from the accountant who failed to provide adequate 
oversight of Crescent's bookkeeping to detect Hurles' thefts. 
Hurles, having relied solely on Parker, has failed to show that under the 
causation standard articulated in Corbus, the Morrisons are not entitled to 
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restitution for the attorneys' fees associated with the lawsuits against the bank 
and the accountant. 10 
Hurles next argues that attorneys' fees associated with the intervention in 
her bankruptcy proceeding are "not compensable because the only logical 
reason for the Morrisons to intervene ... would be to secure funds from the 
bankruptcy estate." (Appellant's Brief, p.33.) According to Hurles, "[s]uch an 
action is a means to prevent a future harm, and the Parker case stated that 
preventing future harm was not compensable through a restitution order." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.33 (quotations and citation omitted).) Again, the relevant 
inquiry is whether the intervention was the actual and proximate cause of Hurles' 
theft from Crescent. Clearly, the Morrisons would not be required to seek 
recovery of their losses from Hurles in whatever forum available but for Hurles' 
thefts from their business and their efforts to do so were completely foreseeable. 
Hurles also complains about the award of $14,876.73 for the legal fees 
associated with the restitution and sentencing hearing. (Appellant's Brief, p.33.) 
Hurles characterizes these fees as the costs for the "paralegal to create a 
spreadsheet" and argues it is "hard to fathom how Givens Pursley accumulated 
$14,876.73 in fees to create a spreadsheet showing t~e Morrisons' losses." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.33.) Hurles' argument assumes the entirety of the 
$14,876.73 is for the creation of the spreadsheet, but such an assumption is not 
warranted. While the paralegal's involvement in creating the spreadsheet may 
10 To the extent the Court finds that the district court also failed to apply the 
correct legal standard for awarding restitution for attorneys' fees, the state would 
request remand for that purpose. 
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be part of the $14,876.73, the "Description" reads, "Legal fees associated with 
Hurles restitution and sentencing hearing," which would encompass the advice of 
counsel in relation to those hearings and counsel's involvement is reflected in the 
record. (PSI, pp.52, 187.) In any event, the Court of Appeals has held, as noted 
in Parker, supra, that expenses associated with "investigating the extent of the 
defendant's theft" are recoverable in restitution. Thus, even assuming the ·entire 
$14,876.73 is attributable to the preparation of the spreadsheet used at the 
restitution hearing to establish the Morrisons' losses, it was entirely appropriate 
for the district court to award restitution for that expense. And, contrary to 
Hurles' assertion, the Morrisons were not required to use, nor did they use, any 
of Mr. Warr's work product in establishing the amount of their loss. (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.33-34.) Nor does it matter that Ms. Berriochoa was not an accountant 
or that there were some errors in her spreadsheet, which were subsequently 
corrected. (Appellant's Brief, p.34.) Hurles certainly cites no authority for the 
proposition that restitution awards may only be calculated by an accountant who 
never makes a mistake. 
Hurles has failed to show error in the district court's inclusion of the 
Morrisons' attorneys' fees in its restitution award. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's 
Order for Restitution and Judgment. 
DATED this 30th day of April 2013. 
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